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INTRODUCTION
The roles and boundaries of religion and state are at the center of a
global debate. As such, American legal history has been no stranger to such
questions as, “What role does religion play in a state?” and, subsequently,
“What are the boundaries of religion and state?”1 In American law, at the
heart of this debate, is the idea of a “wall of separation between Church &
State,” which suggests that individual rights are best served when the state
stays out of religion, and religion stays out of the state.2 Equally stemming
from this debate is the question of whether the wall of separation draws a
hard line that cannot be crossed.3 In McCreary v. ACLU, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor’s concurrence warned that “[t]hose who would renegotiate the
boundaries between church and state must . . . answer a difficult question:
Why would we trade a system that has served us so well for one that has
served others so poorly?”4 However, while the idea of the separation of
church and state has remained fairly constant, the debate over the boundaries
of church and state has always remained in flux.5
Even prior to the adoption of the religion clauses of the U.S.
Constitution,6 the debate over the boundaries of church and state took place
in state and local courthouses.7 The debate encompassed questions of school
funding, reading the Bible in school, who was qualified to sit in state
government, and whether Christianity was a part of American law.8 At one
end, proponents of moral republicanism held that good government depended
on religion.9
At the same time, others pushed for a more secular understanding of
religion and state and the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.10 In
short, how and why individuals or groups want to renegotiate these
boundaries is shaped by how they see the relationship between religion and
state.11
The debate over religion, government, and education illustrates this
struggle between religion and state. Central to this story is whether
government should be required to teach Christian morals through the reading
1 See infra Parts I–II.
2. See infra notes 270–77 and accompanying text. The term “wall of separation” comes
from Thomas Jefferson’s metaphor, sent to the Danbury Baptist Association, which described
the First Amendment religion clause as a “wall of separation between of Church & State.” See
Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President of the U.S., to the Danbury Baptist Ass’n (Jan. 1,
1802), https://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html [https://perma.cc/GU3X-9CE6].
3. See infra notes 73–91, 278–85 and accompanying text.
4. McCreary v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 882 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
5. See infra Parts I–IV.
6. See also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. See infra notes 42–55 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 151–63 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 71–82 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 42–55 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 262–88 and accompanying text.
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of the Bible in a public school. On one side are those who prefer to build
Thomas Jefferson’s famous “wall of separation”12 and declare that the answer
is “no.” Meanwhile, proponents of moral republicanism argue that since
morality is vital to republican society, government must allow religion into
school.13 As such, the government must provide religious education.14 While
the United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of permitting
religious exercises in public schools, the Court has yet to answer whether
morality (Christian or otherwise) is important enough to require government
action.
In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, the United
States Supreme Court held that teacher-led religious exercises, such as
reading the Bible, were not compatible with the concept of neutrality and
separation of church and state.15 The Court stated that the First Amendment
commanded that, “the Government maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding
nor opposing religion.”16
Schempp’s concept of religious neutrality developed from an
accumulation of legal thought on religion and state that shifted from
government support of religion to equal accommodation. Nearly a century
earlier, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Board of Education v. Minor, upheld the
Cincinnati public school’s ban on reading the Bible.17 In Minor, Justice John
Welch reasoned that the best solution between religion and state is a
“doctrine of ‘hands off.’”18 Justice Welch described the doctrine as the “state
not only keep[ing] its own hands off,” but also “see[ing] to it that religious
sects keep their hands off each other.”19 Justice Welch added that the
government keeping its hands off “is the golden truth which it has taken the
world eighteen centuries to learn, and which has at last solved the terrible
enigma of church and state.”20 It was Justice Welch’s doctrine of hands off

12. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Rebecca Riffkin, In U.S.,
Support for Daily Prayer in Schools Dips Slightly, GALLUP (Sept. 25, 2014),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/177401/support-daily-prayer-schools-dips-slightly.aspx
[https://perma.cc/726E-5YVE]; Matthew Sheffield, Poll: 12 percent of Americans Support
New Laws Promoting Bible in Public Schools, T HE HILL (May 24, 2019),
https://thehill.com/hilltv/what-americas-thinking/445477-poll-only-12-percent-ofamericans-support-new-laws-promoting [https://perma.cc/3KGR-56M8].
13. See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 71–82 and accompanying text.
15. 374 U.S. 203, 225–26 (1963).
16. Id. at 225.
17. 23 Ohio St. 211, 250 (1872).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 251. In McCreary, Justice O’Connor reminds us of something similar:
By enforcing the Clauses, we have kept religion a matter for the individual
conscience, not for the prosecutor or bureaucrat. At a time when we see around
the world the violent consequences of the assumption of religious authority by
government, Americans may count themselves fortunate: Our regard for
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that Schempp used when holding that religious exercises were impermissible
in public schools.21 To some, the doctrine of hands off has been seen to form
a strict wall between government and religion.22 Yet, Minor marks a religious
awakening in American legal thought away from a strict wall of separation
into a concept of neutrality, incorporating the concerns of both strict
separatists and moral republicans.23
Now, 145 years after Minor, the Supreme Court and American
society still battle with the concepts of a wall of separation and neutrality.24
With Supreme Court decisions such as Locke v. Davey25 and Trinity Lutheran
v. Comer,26 where does the doctrine of hands off fit into a national
constitutional scheme? Instead of an impregnable wall between church and
state, we find an important relationship between religion and state. In this
relationship, government is neutral and takes into account the interests of
both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Northwest Ordinance and American Republican Desires
As the Constitution was being debated, the Confederation
government issued the governing document for the Northwest Territory: the
Northwest Ordinance.27 The Northwest Territory was a large swath of land
north of the Ohio River, consisting of present-day Ohio, Illinois, Indiana,
Wisconsin, and Michigan.28 The Northwest Ordinance famously guaranteed
religious civil liberties, promoted good will to Native Americans, prohibited
constitutional boundaries has protected us from similar travails, while allowing
private religious exercise to flourish.
McCreary v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 882 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
21. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214–15 (1963) (citing Bd.
of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 250 (1872)).
22. See, e.g., The Colonial and Early National Periods, in 1 CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICA: A BIOGRAPHICAL GUIDE (John F. Wilson ed., 1986); J. Thomas Kirkman, The
Fourth R: Conflicts over Religion in America’s Public Schools, 89 MASS. L. REV. 193,
195 (2006) (book review).
23. See infra Part III.
24. See, e.g., Rebecca Kheel, Scalia: ‘Don’t Cram’ Religious Neutrality ‘Down Throats
of American People’, THE HILL (Jan. 1, 2016, 5:03 PM), http://thehill.com/regulation/courtbattles/264588-scalia-dont-cram-religious-neutrality-down-throats-of-american
[https://perma.cc/2NC2-TAGY]; Jeffrey Rosen, The Refining of Religious Neutrality, N.Y.
TIMES, (June 28, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/28/opinion/the-refining-ofreligious-neutrality.html [https://perma.cc/X664-YDS3].
25. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
26. 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
27. Thomas Nathan Peters, Religion, Establishment, and The Northwest Ordinance: A
Closer Look at an Accommodationist Argument, 89 KY. L.J. 743, 744 (2000). For further
history of the Northwest Ordinance, see Dennis P. Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance as a
Constitutional Document, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 934–40 (1995).
28. Duffey, supra note 27, at 930 n.6.
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slavery, and created a framework for self-government, including dividing the
territory and providing a means to become admitted into the United States.29
In the Religion, Morality, and Knowledge Clause (the “RMK Clause”), the
Northwest Ordinance declared, “Religion, morality, and knowledge, being
necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and
the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”30
When looking for founding principles, legal scholars have generally
overlooked the Northwest Ordinance for other documents, such as the
Constitution, Declaration of Independence, and the Federalist Papers.31
When legal scholars cite the Northwest Ordinance, they generally focus only
on particular provisions.32 Yet, the Northwest Ordinance as a whole has legal
historical significance in understanding the political principles of the
American republic.33 As Professor Dennis Duffey observes, the Northwest
Ordinance has “a special claim to constitutional authority insofar as it is a
founding text of those aspects of our political tradition that draw upon the
principles it contains.”34
Those principles derived from the Northwest Ordinance are
expansionism, development, imperialism, risk (physical and economic),
commercialism, and utopianism.35 The principle of utopianism invoked the
desire to create an ideal social order from scratch.36 As Harold M. Hyman
noted, “[t]he Northwest Ordinance described the future Union of the states
as it should be. The Ordinance, like the Constitution, was a vision as well as
a blueprint for immediate implementation.”37 For example, the Northwest
Ordinance guaranteed religious freedom, barred the existence of slavery, and
encouraged education.38 Further, the Northwest Ordinance outlined moral
goals for the territory.39 More importantly, this utopian ideal was recognized
in the halls of the Supreme Court. For example, in Strader v. Graham, the
plaintiff’s attorney commented that the Ohio River was “like the fabled Styx,
the river of death, which, if once crossed, can never be re-crossed.”40
Importantly, it was partly out of this utopian principle of the Northwest
Ordinance that the debate over the role of church and state began to turn into

29. 1 Stat. 50–53 (1789).
30. 1 Stat. 52 (1789).
31. See generally Duffey, supra note 27, at 930–33.
32. Id. at 931.
33. See generally id. (arguing that the Northwest Ordinance has “constitutional”
significance in understanding the political principles of the republic and thus should have a
spot alongside the Constitution, Federalist Papers, and Declaration of Independence).
34. Id. at 951.
35. Id. at 953–66.
36. Id. at 963.
37. Harold M. Hyman, AMERICAN SINGULARITY: THE 1787 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE,
THE 1862 HOMESTEAD AND MORRILL ACTS, AND THE 1944 G.I. BILL 28 (1986).
38. 1 Stat. 50–53 (1789).
39. Duffey, supra note 27, at 963.
40. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82, 90 (1850) (argument of counsel for plaintiffs).
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the modern debate over religion and state in a republican form of
government.41
B. Religion and State in the Ohio Constitution and Ohio Supreme
Court
In trying to understand the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses,
it has become common practice to consider how state constitutional law
developed in the area of church and state.42 Such a review, over the
interpretation of the Establishment Clause, for example, has centered on the
struggle over religious liberty in Virginia.43 The Virginia struggle pitted
Patrick Henry against James Madison over Henry’s proposal to fund
religious teachers.44 Madison, leading the opposition, fought for a strict
separation of church and state out of a “concern that civil authority not come
between the individual and the working of God’s grace.”45 Although we
should not dismiss the ideas that came from that struggle, looking to Madison
alone risks overlooking the constitutional experiences of other states
regarding the boundaries of church and state.46
Additionally, state review of constitutional practice of church and
state focuses on disestablishment, potentially overlooking free exercise.47
This focus distorts how we view the debate over church and state.48
Additionally, as discussed later, a focus on state practice distorts how we
interpret the religion clauses.49 Under this distorted view, we may conclude
that state constitutions either embodied a secularist perspective or pushed
state constitutional law towards a secularist perspective.50 Instead, we find
early state constitutions that expressly recognized the existence of God, or
41. See infra Sections I.B–C. For a more detailed examination of the Northwest
Ordinance in the debate over the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, see Peters, supra
note 27, at 748–80.
42. A more recent example can be found in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Trinity
Lutheran v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017), which will be analyzed below. See infra Section
IV.B.
43. G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REV. 73, 85 (1989).
44. Id. at 80–84.
45. Id. at 82.
46. Id. at 86.
47. Id. at 87.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. For example, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Trinity Lutheran argues that state
practice showed a move towards taking religion out of the public arena by prohibiting funds
to ministers and houses of worship. See Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 203–36
(2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The course of this history shows that those who lived
under the laws and practices that formed religious establishments made a considered decision
that civil government should not fund ministers and their houses of worship. To us, their
debates may seem abstract and this history remote. That is only because we live in a society
that has long benefited from decisions made in response to these now centuries-old arguments,
a society that those not so fortunate fought hard to build.”).
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acknowledged the state’s dependence on God’s favor.51 This recognition of
church and state fell into the moral republican understanding that religion
and good government went hand-in-hand.52
In short, the history of church and state amongst the states is vague,
and to divine universal meaning from them in order to understand the
Establishment and Free Exercise is difficult.53 Yet, we can see that the state
governments still recognized the importance of religion. Rather than
establish a purely secular society, the states moved to prevent government
intrusion, not religious influence.54 For example, state courts continued to
recognize Christianity as a part of the common law.55
The Northwest Ordinance shaped Ohio’s constitutional experience
on how to handle church and state. Ohio adopted a version of the Northwest
Ordinance’s RMK clause into article I, section 7 of the Ohio constitution.56
Article I, section 7 of the Ohio constitution reads:
I. Rights of conscience; education; the necessity of
religion and knowledge
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
conscience. No person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or
support any place of worship, or maintain any form of
worship, against his consent; and no preference shall be
given, by law, to any religious society; nor shall any
interference with the rights of conscience be permitted . . . .
Religion, morality, and knowledge, however, being essential
to good government, it shall be the duty of the general
assembly to pass suitable laws to protect every religious
denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of
public worship, and to encourage schools and the means of
instruction.57
Section 7’s first half plainly protects the individual right to worship
and exercise religious beliefs.58 However, the second half of section 7 of the
Ohio RMK clause mandated, in the minds of some, that the government
support the teaching of religion as part of the general assembly’s “duty” to

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Tarr, supra note 43, at 87.
See infra Section I.C.
See infra notes 261–63 and accompanying text.
Tarr, supra note 43, at 88.
See, e.g., Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824).
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7.
Id. (emphasis added to show Ohio RMK clause).
See id.
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encourage education.59 Interestingly, the Ohio RMK clause made it a
government duty to make laws that protected every religious denomination.60
Seemingly, the Ohio constitution envisioned a time when government may
have to enter the religious domain, albeit neutrally.
It was not until 1853 that the Ohio Supreme Court would take up the
issue of church and state in Bloom v. Richards and plant the roots of Minor’s
neutrality principle.61 In Bloom, the defendant attempted to void a contract
because it was formed on a Sunday, in violation of the prohibition against
working on the Sabbath.62 However, Judge Thurman disagreed with the
defendant, and upheld the contract’s validity.63 In defending the contract’s
validity, Judge Thurman distinguished the English common law and the Ohio
constitution.64 Judge Thurman posited that although Christianity was a part
of the English common law, it was not a part of the Ohio constitution.65 He
put it bluntly: “We have no union of church and state, nor has our government
ever been vested with authority to enforce any religious observance simply
because it was religious.”66 As such, Ohio’s statute prohibiting labor on the
Sabbath could not stand under the Ohio constitution.67 Therefore, the contract
was enforceable against the defendant.68
The Bloom decision appeared to create Thomas Jefferson’s fabled
wall of separation between church and state in Ohio.69 However, the
existence of any such wall was murky at best. Article I, section 7 of the Ohio
constitution seemingly pointed to government neutrality in religion.70 For
example, the government was mandated to create laws that protect every
denomination.71 Further, the Ohio RMK clause recognized religion and
knowledge as being essential to good government. Does this mandate then
require the Ohio General Assembly to provide for religious education in
public schools? If such a mandate existed, there could not be a wall of
separation between church and state, and neutrality would be a difficult
59. Bd. of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 212–15 (1872); see also Peters, supra note
27, at 748–72 (citing arguments in favor of accommodationists that the Northwest Ordinance
required government to support religious instruction).
60. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7.
61. 2 Ohio St. 387 (1853).
62. Id. at 388.
63. Id. at 392.
64. Id. at 390.
65. Id. at 391.
66. Id. at 392.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Bloom was part of a changing understanding
over the maxim that “Christianity [was] a part of the common law.” Id. at 388. For a more
detailed discussion of this history, see Stuart Banner, When Christianity Was Part of the
Common Law, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 27, 29–44 (1998) (describing the American legal history
of the maxim that Christianity was a part of common law).
70. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7.
71. Id.
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prospect. It was in these murky waters that the Minor case would be decided,
and a new mark in U.S. legal history would be made in the debate over the
role of the state in religion and morality. To some, the fate of the republic
rested on the resolution of that debate.72
C. Moral Republican Education and Religion in the Nineteenth
Century
Common schools, the precursor to public schools, were developed
partly through westward expansion and the growth of cities.73 Westward
expansion and immigration raised worries of “obedience, loyalty, and mutual
understanding between citizens and federal leadership.”74 To alleviate those
concerns, the federal government recommended that half of land sale
proceeds go to funding common schools to “improve . . . the minds and
morals of the present generation, and of generations to come” in order to
create “stronger bonds of union.”75
Religion was at the heart of improving the morals of society and
creating the “stronger bonds of union.”76 Common school advocates drew
their ideas from the religious revivals of their day, in hopes of creating a
republican moral foundation.77 For example, education reformer Horace
Mann believed that the American Revolution removed the restraints on
conduct, and as a result, a “moral reformation” was necessary in order to
avoid anarchy.78 Mann’s desire centered on a “common piety rooted in
Scripture,” a civil society centered on a Christian republic, and a unified
intellectual culture.79 Theologian and education scholar Calvin Stowe added
that “republicanism can be maintained only by universal intelligence and
virtue among the people . . . . [W]ithout intelligence and virtue in the great
mass of the people, our liberties would pass from us.”80 In essence, the
American republic’s fate was tied to Christian morality and an educated
populace.
In practice, common school reformers settled on a non-sectarian
program of reading the Bible without commentary.81 The Bible read without
commentary allowed the listener to judge the passage according to his or her

72. See infra Section I.C.
73. Matthew Steilen, Parental Rights and the State Regulation of Religious Schools,
2009 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 269, 303–10 (2009).
74. Id. at 305.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 310.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Molly O’Brien & Amanda Woodrum, The Constitutional Common School, 51
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 581, 600 (2004).
81. Steilen, supra note 73, at 312.
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own reason and belief.82 Yet, reading the Bible without commentary still
presented a problem. If you were a Protestant that read the King James Bible,
the program did not discriminate against your beliefs.83 But, if you were from
a Christian denomination that did not use the King James Bible, or if you did
not partake in the Bible, reading the Bible without commentary was
discriminatory.84 For those in nineteenth-century Cincinnati, Ohio, this
meant a Roman Catholic student could not hear the Douay Bible in school.85
D. Judicial Backing of Religion in Common Schools
The issue of religion in common schools did not present a novel issue
for the court in Minor.86 By the time of Minor, state courts put legal force
into the belief that the United States was a Christian (i.e., Protestant) nation.87
Judges accomplished this by giving “constitutional significance” to the
phrase “Christian nation.”88 The courts reasoned that religious practices were
protected because they were a part of a “broad tradition of American civic
religion.”89 Further, in states where the Northwest Ordinance applied, such
as Ohio, judges read the RMK clause as mandating religious education unless
the constitution said otherwise.90 Finally, state courts found non-sectarian
religious practices at schools did not violate an individual’s religious
liberty.91
II. CINCINNATI’S BIBLE WAR
A. The Accidental War
In the mid-nineteenth century, Cincinnati was one of the most
religiously diverse cities in the United States.92 Cincinnati’s Roman Catholic
population was bolstered by waves of Irish and German immigrants.93 The
most recent wave of German immigrants consisted of Roman Catholic
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Corinna Barrett Lain, God, Civic Virtue, and the American Way: Reconstructing
Engel, 67 STAN. L. REV. 479, 488 (2015).
86. Michael Dehaven Newsom, Common School Religion: Judicial Narratives in a
Protestant Empire, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 219, 244 (2002) (describing the common
features faced by state courts in religion cases).
87. Id. at 252; see also Banner, supra note 69, at 32–44 (describing the American legal
history of the maxim that Christianity was a part of common law).
88. Newsom, supra note 86, at 252.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 255.
92. STEVEN K. GREEN, THE BIBLE, THE SCHOOL, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CLASH
THAT SHAPED MODERN CHURCH-STATE DOCTRINE 94 (2012).
93. Id.
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liberals and freethinkers from the failed revolutions that struck Europe in
1848.94 Additionally, the nation’s two leading Jewish leaders called the city
home.95
When Cincinnati opened its first common school in 1829, Protestants
and nativists hoped that the school would promote protestant-republicanism
to “assimilate immigrant children into American culture.”96 The influx of
diversity troubled the Protestant population of the Ohio valley.97 They feared
that the growth of Roman Catholic immigrants would make the valley
predominately Roman Catholic.98 Further, they worried that the Ohio valley
could become a home base to individuals that posed a threat to American
republican ideals.99 For example, Preacher Lyman Beecher described the
threat posed by the Roman Catholic population.100 Beecher proclaimed that
the threat lay in the “political claims and character of the Catholic religion,
and its church and state alliance with the political and ecclesiastical
governments of Europe hostile to liberty . . . . Their policy points them to the
West, the destined centre of civilization and political power they once
had.”101 Thus, protestant-republicanism and morality in schools would prove
to be central issues in the Cincinnati Bible War.102
As with other common schools in the United States, the Cincinnati
common school system had a Protestant character.103 The Protestant
character was reflected in the character of prayers, textbooks, and Bible
readings without commentary.104 Roman Catholic Bishop John Purcell
criticized the Protestantism of the common schools, calling them a “sectarian
free-school” where the children’s “foundations of spiritual life are poisoned
and those unsuspecting children have tracts placed in their hands, insinuating
the vilest and most malicious slander of our real principles.”105 Nonetheless,
the Cincinnati school board and Roman Catholic leaders attempted to create
accommodations to allow for dissenting students to be excused or allow their
scripture of choice to be read.106 But, Bishop Purcell refused to accept
accommodations and instead created private schools for Cincinnati’s Roman
Catholic children.107

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 95.
97. Id. at 94–95.
98. Id. at 95; see supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text.
99. GREEN, supra note 92, at 95.
100. Id. at 94–95.
101. Id.
102. See infra Section II.B.
103. GREEN, supra note 92, at 95.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 96.
107. Id.
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In 1869, the Cincinnati Bible War began with a proposed merger
between the common schools and the Roman Catholic private schools.108
Under the proposal, Roman Catholic teachers would be allowed to stay at
their old schools but would only be able to teach secular subjects.109 Samuel
Miller, a school board member and lawyer, proposed a separate resolution
prohibiting “religious instruction and the reading of religious books
including the Holy Bible.”110 Miller claimed that the purpose of the proposal
was to “allow the children of parents of all sects and opinions, in matters of
faith and worship, to enjoy alike the benefit of the school fund.”111
Additionally, Samuel Miller hoped that his proposal would facilitate the
merger.112
Although Miller’s resolution was not a part of the merger
negotiations, the public believed the two were intertwined.113 The Methodist
Christian Advocate claimed that the proposed merger would ruin the republic
by endangering the moral and intellectual development of the youth.114 The
merger was also unpopular amongst the Roman Catholic population, and the
proposed merger was tabled.115 However, Miller’s resolution banning
religious instruction and reading the Bible from the Cincinnati public schools
remained and was scheduled for a vote on November 1, 1869.116 This allowed
pro- and anti-Bible forces to muster. During the board debate, pro-Bible
forces advocated the importance of moral education that the Bible
provided.117 For example, Rufus King, grandson of a signer of the
Constitution, argued that the Bible was the “cornerstone of our American
institutions.”118 Nonetheless, Miller’s resolution passed 22–15.119
B. The Trial and Two Theories of Church and State
Twenty-eight days later, on November 29th, the pro-Bible faction
moved to enjoin the Bible ban.120 At trial, the school board’s resolution
carried a presumption of validity.121 Thus, the pro-Bible attorneys centered
their argument on the Bible ban as an act of ultra vires.122 They argued that
the Northwest Ordinance desire for “religion, morality, and knowledge,”
108. Id. at 97.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 98.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 100.
119. Id. at 101.
120. Id. at 104.
121. Id. at 105.
122. Id.
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incorporated into article I, section 7 of the Ohio constitution, imposed a duty
on government to promote religion.123 Further, the pro-Bible faction added
that only religious instruction, not secular education, could bring the moral
education a society requires.124 Although the Bloom court denied Christianity
as part of the common law, the pro-Bible attorneys contended that the Ohio
constitution recognized religion as “the bond of society, the basis upon which
our institutions rest, as essential to good government.”125 In sum, this
recognition (that religion was essential to good government), together with
the alleged duty in the Ohio RMK clause to promote religion, obligated
public schools to teach religion.126
The school board’s attorney argued that neither the Northwest
Ordinance nor the Ohio constitution obligated religious instruction.127 The
Northwest Ordinance, the attorney argued, implied only that religion,
morality, and knowledge would be an outgrowth of an educated public.128
However, if religious instruction was mandated, religion meant all religions
and not a specific sect.129 Finally, the school board argued that religious
preference was in tension with the “foundation of our republican institutions”
because the constitution did not prefer one religion to another.130
Both sides ended oral arguments in front of a panel of three
Cincinnati superior court judges on December 3, 1869.131 Perhaps sensing
the importance of the case, the panel did not return its decision until February
15, 1870.132 In three separate opinions, the panel voted 2–1 to enjoin the
school board’s resolution prohibiting religious instruction and reading the
Bible in school.133
In the leading opinion, Judge Hagans held that the school board acted
ultra vires. Judge Hagans conceded that a government obligation to
encourage religion conflicted with the Ohio constitution.134 Yet, Judge
Hagans interpreted a solution through article I, section 7 of the Ohio
constitution.135 Under article I, section 7, the Ohio general assembly has a
duty to “pass suitable laws to protect every religious denomination in the
peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship.”136 Accordingly,
this placed a duty on the government to facilitate “religious fealty

123. Id. at 106.
124. Id. at 105.
125. Id. at 107.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 109.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 110.
131. Id. at 104, 111.
132. Id. at 111–12.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 112.
135. Id.
136. Id.; see also OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7.
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generally.”137 Religious instruction, Judge Hagans held, fell into the
government’s duty to generally facilitate “religious fealty.”138
Rather than stop, Judge Hagans dived deeper into the meaning of
religion and the state. According to Judge Hagans, religion was an adjunct of
the state.139 “The framers of the Constitution,” Judge Hagans explained, “that
the moral sense must necessarily be regulated and controlled by the religious
belief [estimated by the Christian standard].”140 The framers’ obligation to
regulate the “moral sense” was found in the phrase, “religion, morality and
knowledge are essential to good government.”141 Those that opposed this
belief opposed the “general public sense” that upheld the law and the
community.142 As such, to prohibit religious instruction was to “cut off the
instrumentality by which those essentials to good government are
cultivated.”143 Because Miller’s resolution attacked the “moral sense” of the
law, the resolution could not stand.
In his dissent, Judge Alphonso Taft, father of future President and
Chief Justice William Howard Taft, contended that the school board had the
discretion to manage the school how they saw fit.144 Judge Taft further argued
that the school board’s resolution should only be overturned if it violated a
clear state law.145 Judge Taft explained that the RMK clause of article I,
section 7 did not mandate a government obligation but only recognized that
religion, morality, and knowledge would be promoted generally through
education.146
Next, Judge Taft reminded the superior court that in Bloom, the Ohio
Supreme Court found that Christianity was not above the law.147 In a counter
to Judge Hagans’s “moral sense theory,” Judge Taft drafted his own theory
of church and state.148 Judge Taft elaborated that the Bill of Rights protected
the religious opinion of all sects.149 The constitution indicated “a neutrality
toward all sects, which would not be otherwise maintained, and which had
become essential to religious peace.”150 To allow the reading of Protestant
beliefs in public schools was to permit a union of church and state.151 In short,
the Bill of Rights required government neutrality towards religion.152 As
137. GREEN, supra note 92, at 112.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 112–13.
142. Id. at 112.
143. Id. at 113.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 113–14.
146. Id. at 114.
147. Id. at 114–15.
148. Id. at 114.
149. Id. at 115.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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such, the board’s resolution did not conflict with the constitution, but rather
the resolution was in line with the requisite principle of neutrality.
Both Judges Taft and Hagans submitted two opposed theories of
church and state. Judge Hagans’s theory was rooted in the Protestant
republicanism of the early nineteenth century.153 But Judge Taft marked a
more modern theory—one of government neutrality. Unbeknownst to
Samuel Miller, his resolution, created to help a proposed (but ultimately
failed) merger, brought before the Ohio Supreme Court two major
questions.154 Is the government obligated to promote religion through schools
to protect the “moral sense” of the law, or does the Ohio Bill of Rights require
government neutrality on the issue of church and state?155 Miller’s resolution
now implicated much more than bibles.
Broadly, the opinions of Judges Taft and Hagans reflected the
changing legal debate of whether or not Christianity was a part of American
common law. Prior to American independence, William Blackstone, in his
Commentaries on the Laws of England, stated, “Christianity is part of the
laws of England.”156 Blackstone’s statement attached itself to the American
common law. In People v. Ruggles, Judge James Kent opined, “Christianity,
in its enlarged sense, as a religion revealed and taught in the Bible, is not
unknown to our law.”157 From Ruggles, state courts and legal treatises
affirmed: “[T]he proposition, that Christianity is a part of the common law,
is supported by the very highest judicial authority both in England and in this
country.”158
153. See supra Section I.B.
154. GREEN, supra note 92, at 115.
155. Id.
156. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765),
reprinted in London: Dawsons 59 (4 vol. 1766); see also De Costa v. De Paz (1754) 36 Eng.
Rep. 1, 715; 2 Swans. 1, 532; Rex v. Woolston (1729) 94 Eng. Rep. 1, 655; Fitz-G. 1, 64; The
King v. Curl (1727) 94 Eng. Rep. 1, 20; 1 Barn KB 1, 29.
157. People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 293–94 (N.Y. 1811). This point has been a staple
of Kent’s lectures for some time. See James Kent, Of the Theory, History and Duty of Civil
Government, in DISSERTATIONS: BEING THE PRELIMINARY PART OF A COURSE OF LAW
LECTURES (1795), reprinted in Littleton, Colo.: F.B. Rothman 5, 24 (1991).
158. See, e.g., Goree v. State, 71 Ala. 7, 9 (1881); Shover v. State, 10 Ark. 259 (1850);
State v. Chandler, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 553, 555–56 (1837); Melvin v. Easley, 52 N.C. 378 (1860);
Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 400 (Pa. 1824); City Council of
Charleston v. Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 508 (S.C. 1846); Bell v. State, 31 Tenn. 41, 44
(1851); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 467, 472 (Bos.: Little,
Brown 1868); Nathan Dane, Crimes Against Religion and Morality, in 6 A GENERAL
ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 664, 675 (Bos.: Cummings, Hilliard & Co.
1823); FORTUNATUS DWARRIS, A GENERAL TREATISE ON STATUTES 525, 559 (Platt Potter ed.,
Albany: W. Gould & Sons 1871); THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH
GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1,
17 (N.Y.C.: J. S. Voorhies 1857); Joseph Story, Christianity a Part of the Common Law, in 9
THE AMERICAN JURIST AND LAW MAGAZINE 346, 346–48 (Bos.: Lilly, Wait, and Co. 1833);
CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED
STATES 166, 167 (St. Louis: F. H. Thomas Law Book Co., 1886); see also P. Emory Aldrich,
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Although American legal thought in the early nineteenth century
upheld Christianity’s place in law, the notion did have its opponents. Justice
Joseph Story claimed that “[t]he error of the Common Law” was that it
“tolerated nothing but Christianity, as taught by its own established church,
either Protestant or Catholic; and with unrelenting severity consigned the
conscientious heretic to the stake.”159 A Philadelphia lawyer put it more
plainly:
The doctrine that the “Christian religion is a part of the
common law,” . . . was promulgated in the worst times, and
by the worst men of a government that avowedly united
church and state; in times when men were sent to the block
or to the stake on any frivolous charge of heresy. . . . These
consequences of the doctrine were very satisfactory to the
English government, in its origin. They enabled the tyrants
of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to find a convenient
excuse for sending to the block any one who became
obnoxious to them.160
Justice Story held that the United States corrected that mistake,
where now “the morals of the law are of the purest and most irreproachable
character.”161 As the Minor case was being argued, Justice Charles Doe of
the New Hampshire Supreme Court reflected, in a dissenting opinion, “the
maxim, that Christianity is part of the laws of England, is a relic of the time
when the clergy ruled England; when ambassadors, judges, and chief
ministers of state were ecclesiastics. It is the acknowledgement of a state
religion.”162 Justice Doe concluded that “[w]hen church and state are one, the
Christianity of any sect established as the religion of the state is, to some
extent, the law of the land.”163
By the mid- to late-nineteenth century, legal thinkers began to refine
and narrow the scope of what makes up law.164 In the process, the notion that
Christianity was a part of the law as a legal proposition declined.165 Law was
limited to rules backed by some sanction from the state.166 Law stood as a
The Christian Religion and the Common Law, in 6 AMERICAN ANTIQUARIAN SOCIETY
PROCEEDINGS 18, 33–34 (1889).
159. For Justice Story’s full speech, see JOSEPH STORY, THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS,
LITERARY, CRITICAL, JURIDICIAL, AND POLITICAL, OF JOSEPH STORY 440–76 (Bos.: James
Munroe & Co. 1835); see also JOSEPH STORY, VALUE AND IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL STUDIES
503, 517 (William W. Story ed., Bos.: Little, Brown 1852).
160. Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312, 315–16 (1848).
161. For the speech reported in full, see STORY, supra note 159, at 440–76.
162. Hale v. Everett, 53 N.H. 9, 209 (1868) (Doe, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. See generally Banner, supra note 69, at 49–60 (discussing how the legal proposition
that Christianity was a part of the common law began to decline).
165. Id. at 57.
166. See Bd. of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 247 (1872).
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separate body of principles formulated and enforced by government
officials.167 Religion was not a part of the law because it was not formulated
and enforced by government officials.168 As such, when the source of law is
narrowed to government enforcement, rather than a wide range of external
sources, religion does not have a place in law.169
III. THE MINOR DECISION
A. The Arguments
The Cincinnati school board appealed the superior court’s decision
to the Ohio Supreme Court.170 The school board’s attorneys argued that the
board had the authority and discretion to dictate how the school was run.171
Further, the school board built onto the theory set out by Judge Taft.172 The
school board elaborated that reading the Bible was a form of worship that
compelled against the consent of others and, therefore, violated article I,
section 7 of the Ohio constitution.173 Additionally, the school board
hypothesized that if aid were given to religion, religion would become an
impermissible “creature of the state.”174 As a result, the board’s attorney
expressed to the court that the interest of both church and state were protected
by the principle of separation of church and state.175
The pro-Bible faction continued their claim that the school board did
not have the power to prohibit the Bible from schools.176 The faction’s
attorney held, as did Judge Hagans, that article I, section 7 of the Ohio

167. Banner, supra note 69, at 58.
168. Id. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not provided a firm definition of religion,
the Court’s attempts to define “religion” have focused on philosophical beliefs rather than a
religion’s ability to enforce its tenets. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec.
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 248 (1972); United States
v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (“The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by
the God.”); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (“Neither a State nor the Federal
Government can constitutionally force a person ‘to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion.’ Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions
as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence
of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs.”); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S.
333, 342 (1890) (“The term ‘religion’ has reference to one’s views of his relations to his
Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of
obedience to his will. It is often confounded with the cultus or form of worship of a particular
sect, but is distinguishable from the latter.”).
169. See Banner, supra note 69, at 58–59.
170. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211.
171. Id. at 216–17.
172. See supra notes 141–49 and accompanying text.
173. Minor, 23 Ohio St. at 217.
174. Id. at 221.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 222–25.
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constitution created a duty on the government to teach religion.177 Religious
instruction was a necessity of the state.178 The framers of the Constitution
intended for an “intermingling of a religious morality with the intellectual
education of the young.”179 Such intermingling was permissible because
school is, for some children, the only place they would receive religious
instruction.180
Finally, the pro-Bible attorneys attacked the rationale of the Ohio
Supreme Court’s ruling in Bloom. They contended that the notion of
separation of church and state was nothing but a ghost.181 Because the line
between church and state was non-existent, Bloom’s remarks on Christianity
in the law were extraneous.182 Instead, the “true relation” between religion
and state was government coming to the aid of religion, not leaving it to fend
for itself.183 A resolution banning the Bible in school was the antithesis of the
“true relation” between religion and state. However, the “true relation”
argument was weakened by the fact that it was based only on non-Ohio
precedent for support.184
B. Justice Welch’s Opinion
Justice Welch was in charge of crafting the Ohio Supreme Court’s
decision in Minor. Justice Welch was a one-time Whig prosecutor in Athens
County, Ohio, a state senator, and a member of the U.S. House of
Representatives.185 During the Civil War, he served as a Common Pleas
judge until being appointed in 1865 to a seat on the Ohio Supreme Court.186
In 1867 and 1872, Justice Welch was elected to full terms on the Ohio
Supreme Court.187
In the beginning, Justice Welch carefully emphasized what the case
was not about. The case was not about morality, religion, or the wisdom of
having or not having the Bible in schools.188 Rather, the “real question,”
Justice Welch explained, was whether the court had “jurisdiction to interfere
in the management and control of such schools, to the extent of enforcing
religious instructions, or the reading of religious books therein[.]”189 Then,
177. Id. at 225–27.
178. Id. at 228.
179. Id. at 226–27.
180. Id. at 227.
181. Id. at 233.
182. Id. at 234.
183. Id. at 234–35.
184. Id.
185. John Welch, THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO & THE OHIO JUDICIARY SYSTEM,
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/SCO/formerjustices/bios/welch.asp (last visited June 17,
2019) [https://perma.cc/4VES-5ZYE].
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Minor, 23 Ohio St. at 238.
189. Id.
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he added a second jurisdictional question: “Do the laws of Ohio clothe its
courts with power to interfere, either by injunction or mandate, to compel
religious instructions and reading of religious books in public schools of the
state?”190 The Ohio Supreme Court unanimously found that both questions
had to be answered in the negative.191
According to Justice Welch, article I, section 7 did not mandate that
the government endorse religious instruction in public schools.192 The phrase
“religion, morality, and knowledge” only spoke to “other areas of learning in
the schools.”193 Morality and good conduct did not require the teaching of
religion to a pupil, nor a religious teacher.194 Justice Welch pointedly stated
that had religious instruction been mandated, then the “legislation of the
nearly half a century have failed so to interpret it” to require religious
instruction.195 As a result, there had been no laws passed enforcing such a
mandate.196
At this point, Justice Welch could have stopped and inferred that if
the government was not mandated to support religion, a school could create
a resolution not supporting religion. In short, the school board had the
discretion to issue a resolution forbidding the reading of the Bible. Because
the issue was a part of the school board’s discretion, it would be, as Judge
Taft claimed, that the court could only interfere in a school board’s
discretionary decisions if it violated a clear state law.197 Instead, Justice
Welch dove deeper into the meaning of religion and the state.
Article I, section 7’s use of “religion, morality, and knowledge”
provided the court and legislature no direction. The language of article I,
section 7 could be read as “true ‘religion’ and ‘morality’ are aided and
promoted by the increase and diffusion of ‘knowledge,’ on the theory that
‘knowledge is the hand-maid of virtue,’ and that all three—religion, morality,
and knowledge—are essential to good government.”198 But, the language
gives “no direction” to “what system of general knowledge, or of religion or
morals, shall be taught; nor as to what particular branches of such system or
systems shall be introduced into the ‘schools;’ nor is any direction given as
to what other ‘means of instruction’ shall be employed.”199 Without any
direction, what was meant by religion and morality was left to legislative
discretion, subject to the limitations of the Ohio Bill of Rights.200

190. Id. at 240.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 241.
193. Id. at 242.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 242–43.
197. See GREEN, supra note 92, at 113.
198. Minor, 23 Ohio St. at 244.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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Justice Welch then turned his attention to the issue of Christianity
and the law. Justice Welch observed that religion did not mean “Christian
religion.”201 “When they speak of ‘religion,’” Justice Welch began, “[we]
must mean the religion of man, and not the religion of any class of men.”202
Similarly, when it is spoken that “all men” have certain rights, it cannot mean
merely “all Christian men.”203 As Justice Welch rationalized, this was
because “some of the very men who helped to frame these [state]
constitutions were themselves not Christian men.”204 Therefore, the language
of Bloom was not extraneous, and Justice Welch reaffirmed the holding in
Bloom.205
According to Justice Welch, religion and government were best
when kept in their own domains. He warned that when religion joins with
government or the domain of law, religion never “rises above the merest
superstition, [and] government never rises above the merest despotism.”206
Religion, Justice Welch declared, was not an object of government.207 Rather,
religion served as a provider of tenets to create a better society. Justice Welch
explained, “Religion is ‘essential’ to much more than human government. It
is essential to man’s spiritual interests, which rise infinitely above, and are to
outlive, all human governments.”208 The framers were content with holding
that religion was to be enjoyed “each in his own way, and providing means
for the diffusion of general knowledge among the people.”209 However, we
would be mistaken if we claimed that Justice Welch was making a secular
case denying Christianity’s influential role in the development of law.
Rather than just reaffirming Bloom’s statement on Christianity not
being a part of the law, Justice Welch proceeded to refine religion’s place in
law.210 In doing so, Justice Welch attempted to fit both the moral republican
belief of morality’s importance in government and Judge Hagans’s “moral
sense” theory into a concept of neutrality. Although the Northwest
Ordinance’s RMK clause did not create a government obligation, Justice
Welch agreed that religion was essential to government.211 Religion had the
“instrumentalities for producing and perfecting a good form of
government.”212 This was because religion was the parent of good
government and not the “offspring” of government.213 Good government
201. Id. at 245.
202. Id. at 246.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 248–49.
206. Id. at 248.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 246, 248–49.
211. Id. at 248.
212. Id. (emphasis in original).
213. Id. at 249.
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needed religion, but importantly, good government could not control
religion.214 If government controlled religion, a good government could not
be created.215
Justice Welch proposed that if the best form of government required
the best religion, it was not the government’s choice to decide the “best”
religion.216 What Justice Welch imagined was a “marketplace of religion”
similar to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s marketplace of ideas.217 In this
marketplace of religion, the government keeps its hands off religion, and the
“best will triumph in the end.”218 However, the hands-off nature of the
marketplace did not mean that government could not aid religion. Instead,
Justice Welch stated, “the state will impartially aid all parties in their
struggles after religious truth, by providing means for the increase of general
knowledge, which is the handmaid of good government, as well as of true
religion and morality.”219
By allowing the state to impartially aid all parties, Justice Welch
appears to hold that if government aids one sect (e.g., Southern Baptist),
government must aid all other sects (e.g., Roman Catholic). Consequently,
Justice Welch’s theory on religion and state is not one calling for a complete
wall of separation but rather a theory of equal accommodation and neutrality.
As such, Minor is a step down from the wall of separation advocated in
Schempp.220 Religion and state are in separate domains, but because religion
is the “handmaid of good government,” there are moments where the wall
can be stepped over.221 But if stepped over, government, or law in Justice
Welch’s phraseology, cannot benefit one religion over the other.222 In sum,
according to Justice Welch, religion lay outside the “legitimate province of
government,” and government could not choose one religion over another
religion.223 Reading the Bible in schools put one religion (i.e., Protestants)
over another (i.e., Roman Catholics).224 The superior court’s injunction
preventing the school board’s prohibition on reading a Bible passage was
overturned.225

214. Id. at 248–49; see GREEN, supra note 92, at 105–07.
215. Minor, 23 Ohio St. at 248.
216. Id. at 251.
217. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(describing the “marketplace of ideas”).
218. Minor, 23 Ohio St. at 251.
219. Id.
220. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214–15 (1963) (citing
Bd. of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 250 (1872)).
221. See Minor, 23 Ohio St. at 246, 248–49.
222. See id. at 251.
223. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(describing the “marketplace of ideas”); Minor, 23 Ohio St. at 246, 248–51.
224. Minor, 23 Ohio St. at 254.
225. Id.
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IV. LEGACY
A. Blaine, Wall of Separation, and Neutrality
The Minor decision marked a middle ground between secularists,
who advocated that the First Amendment mandated an impregnable “wall of
separation” between church and state, and moral republicans, who argued
that the government must promote religion. Broadly, Justice Welch fused
together early American republican moral desires through recognizing
religion’s importance to government and the concerns of separationists into
a theory of neutrality.226 A change in thought in the boundaries of religion
and state began to take hold. Beyond Cincinnati, other cities such as Chicago,
New York City, Buffalo, and Rochester voted to prohibit Bible-reading and
religious exercises in public schools.227
Further, as Roman Catholics began to gain a political foothold in
cities, Protestants joined with nativist groups in a campaign to preserve
religion in public school and deny government support of sectarian
institutions.228 Out of this situation, the Blaine Amendment of 1876 became
a significant political event in American history.229 As Steven Green
contends,
The specific issue at hand—application of the First
Amendment religion clauses to the states with an express
prohibition on funding religious schools—became
subsumed in a much larger matrix involving a growing
discomfort with the forces of change in post-Civil War
America and an uncertainty over the future direction of the
nation.230
As such, the Blaine Amendment symbolized a defense of American values
and institutions pressured by “immigration, race, Reconstruction,
urbanization, and industrialization.”231
The Blaine Amendment proposed an addition to the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution that would bar state public funds, in
particular, public funds collected for public schools, from being “under the
control of any religious sect; nor shall any money so raised or lands so

226. See supra Section I.C.
227. Joseph P. Viteritti, Davey’s Plea: Blaine, Blair, Witters, and the Protection of
Religious Freedom, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 299, 310 (2003).
228. Id.
229. Steven K. Green, Insignificance of the Blaine Amendment, 2008 BYU L. REV. 295,
318 (2008).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 322.
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devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations.”232 In the
Blaine Amendment, the Republican Party hoped to find an issue to help them
challenge the upstart Democratic Party.233 The Blaine Amendment went
against the common understanding, at the time, that the First Amendment did
not prohibit aid to religious schools.234 Further, in 1876, because the religion
clauses did not yet apply to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, it was
assumed that the states were free to define religious freedom.235
However, the Blaine Amendment did not provoke serious
constitutional debate.236 The Congressional debate centered on the issues of
partisanship, federalism, states’ rights, securing public school financing, and
the danger imposed by Catholics on such financing.237 While each side made
rhetorical arguments surrounding the principle of separation of church and
state, no congressman saw the proposal as affecting existing legal
principles.238 For example, Senator Frederick Frelinghuysen stated the Blaine
Amendment affirmed the principles of freedom of conscience and
individuals not being “taxed for sectarian purposes.”239 Senator
Frelinghuysen added, “The whole history of our country, from its origin to
the present day, establishes and fortifies these positions.”240 In the end, the
Blaine Amendment failed to garner enough votes to reach the necessary twothirds majority in the Senate.241
Nonetheless, by 1890, twenty-nine states added similar provisions in
their state constitutions.242 State versions of the Blaine Amendment varied
232. Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38,
53 n.96 (1992).
233. Green, supra note 229, at 320–24.
234. Viteritti, supra note 227, at 312; see also Alfred Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and
the Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L. REV. 939, 942 (1951) (discussing the federalism issue as it
pertains to the Blaine Amendment); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School Choice, the
First Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657, 661–66
(1998) (explaining that the Establishment Clause had not yet been applied to prohibit federal
funding of religious institutions).
235. See Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845)
(holding that the religion clauses of the First Amendment do not apply to the states); Barron
v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
236. Green, supra note 229, at 324–27; see also Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview
and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns,
26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 565–73 (2003) (highlighting the debate of the Blaine
Amendment in Congress).
237. Green, supra note 229, at 324.
238. Id.
239. See 4 CONG. REC. 5561 (1876) (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen).
240. Id.
241. Viteritti, supra note 227, at 312.
242. Id. For examples of state Blaine Amendments, see ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 263;
ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 10; ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; COLO.
CONST. art V, § 34; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 3; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3, art. IX, § 6; GA. CONST.
art. I, § 2, para. 7; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 5; IND. CONST. art. I, § 6;
KY. CONST. §§ 186, 189; MASS. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4, art. VIII,
§ 2; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16, art. XIII, § 2; MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 208; MO. CONST. art. I,
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from one state to the next.243 Mark DeForrest describes the variety of the state
Blaine Amendments as a spectrum.244 On one end, state courts construe
Blaine Amendments narrowly and thus restrict their scope.245 On the other
end, state courts have allowed indirect and direct aid to religious schools.246
In the middle, are states and state courts that permit indirect government
funding to religious schools, but prohibit overt funding.247
State Blaine Amendments have faced criticism, using the Blaine
Amendment’s background in religious bigotry to discredit advocates of
prohibiting funding of religious schools.248 For example, Justice Clarence
Thomas, in Mitchell v. Helms, stated that the Blaine Amendment, the legal
doctrine barring funding of religious schools, “has a shameful pedigree that
we [should] not hesitate to disavow . . . . This doctrine, born of bigotry,
should be buried now.”249 In addition to the objectionable background of the
Blaine Amendment, the Blaine Amendment also raises federal constitutional
concerns.250
Joseph Viteritti observes:
[H]istory informs our understanding that the Blaine
Amendment and its state-derived progeny were written to
circumscribe and undermine American constitutional
principles designed to protect members of religious
minorities, be they Roman Catholic immigrants arriving
from Ireland at the height of the nativist movement, or young
men pursuing a vocation in the ministry in the heyday of a
secularist popular culture.251
Because religious freedom is vital to the “American scheme of
democracy,” religious freedom should not be defined one way in one state,
and another in another state.252 Viteratti’s argument brings up questions of
federalism, and whether there are limits to state constitutional practice. As
mentioned earlier, state constitutional practice plays an important role in

§ 7, art. IX, §§ 5, 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 4, para. 2; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 3; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3; N.C. CONST. art V, § 12, art.
IX, § 6; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 5, art. XI, § 5; S.D. CONST. art VIII,
§ 16; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 5; VA. CONST. art VIII, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11, art. IX,
§ 4; WIS. CONST. art. X, § 6; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 12.
243. DeForrest, supra note 236, at 576–90.
244. Id. at 577.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Green, supra note 229, at 296.
249. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828–29 (2000).
250. DeForrest, supra note 236, at 602.
251. Viteritti, supra note 227, at 324–25.
252. Id. at 325.
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understanding the U.S. Constitution, particularly the religion clauses. 253
Further, the Supreme Court has described the states as “laboratories” in the
development of individual rights and liberties.254 As the Supreme Court
began to incorporate the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, this
concern for state constitutional practice remained.
Justice Brennan coined this concern, or rather identified the legal
development as, a “theory of neo-federalism.”255 Neo-federalism grew out of
the development of selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment and thus applying the Bill of Rights to the states.256
Under neo-federalist thought, the U.S. Constitution provided a “floor,” or a
minimum level of protection, that the states could not violate.257 States were
permitted to provide a ceiling, or a maximum extent of rights, but could not
provide fewer or more restricted rights.258 As such, if a state constitutional
provision limits fundamental rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, that
253. See supra Section I.B.
254. See Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009) (“We have long recognized the role of
the States as laboratories for devising solutions to difficult legal problems.”); see also New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
255. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). It should be noted that while Brennan identified and
explained the development of neo-federalism, he by no means created the principle. Rather,
he described and discussed a trend that was already occurring on the state level. See Robert F.
Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic
Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 30 (1989). For an
examination of one state’s approach to the complex jurisprudence surrounding the relationship
of federal and state constitutional guarantees under the doctrine of neo-federalism, see Linda
White Atkins, Recent Development: Federalism, Uniformity, and the State Constitution—
State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), 62 WASH. L. REV. 569 (1987); Daryl
R. Hague, Note, New Federalism and “Occupation of the Field”: Failing to Maintain State
Constitutional Protections Within a Preemption Framework—Alverado v. Washington Public
Power Supply System, 111 Wash. 2d 424, 759 P.2d 427 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 163,
64 WASH. L. REV. 721 (1989).
256. DeForrest, supra note 236, at 605.
257. Brennan, supra note 255, at 495, 502; see also Utter, supra note 255, at 30.
258. Utter, supra note 255, at 30; see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 706–
07 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dual nature of our constitutional system, with the
federal government setting a minimal constitutional standard, should not be construed as
rendering state constitutions irrelevant. As Justice Stevens writes:
[S]tate constitutions preceded the Federal Constitution and were obviously
intended to have independent significance. The frequent amendments to state
constitutions likewise presuppose their continued importance. Thus, whether
the national minimum set by the Federal Constitution is high or low, state
constitutions have their own unique origins, history, language, and structure—
all of which warrant independent attention and elucidation. State courts remain
primarily responsible for reviewing the conduct of their own executive
branches, for safeguarding the rights of their citizenry, and for nurturing the
jurisprudence of state constitutional rights which it is their exclusive province
to expound.
Id. (citations omitted).
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state provision is unconstitutional.259 Arguably, although the Blaine
Amendments may withstand the Establishment Clause, the Blaine
Amendments may at the same time violate the Free Exercise Clause.260
The concept of neutrality in religion and state did not reach the
Supreme Court until the mid-twentieth century. In Everson v. Board of
Education, the Supreme Court took the step of incorporating the
Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.261 Since then, the concept of neutrality has had to jostle with
Jefferson’s “wall of separation.”262 Further, the use of neutrality differs with
competing interpretations under the religion clauses.263 Scholars and the
United States Supreme Court have observed that there is an interpretative
tension between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.264 The tension
between the two clauses is partly due to the Supreme Court observing that
there is “play in the joints” and interpreting the two clauses differently.265 In
time, “play in the joints” has come to mean that things prohibited by one
clause are not required by the other, leaving the states to experiment with
greater free exercise or establishment provisions.266 Regardless of the
different interpretations utilized by the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses, the Supreme Court has held that the focus was on “the adherence to
the policy of neutrality.”267
259. DeForrest, supra note 236, at 606.
260. See id. at 602; see also sources cited infra notes 280–94 and accompanying text.
261. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
262. See supra note 3; infra notes 264–79 and accompanying text.
263. See infra notes 264–79 and accompanying text.
264. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971) (noting “internal tension in the
First Amendment between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause”); Sylvia
Sohn Penneys, Note, And Now for a Moment of Silence: Wallace v. Jaffree, 39 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 935, 940 (1985) (recognizing potential tension between these two clauses if both are
interpreted broadly); see generally Katie Hosford, Note, The Search For a Distinct ReligiousLiberty Jurisprudence Under the Washington State Constitution, 75 WASH. L. REV. 643, 644
(2000) (“[F]ree exercise and separation of church and state have potential to lead to
contradictory results.”). Scholars have argued that this tension is avoidable. See Carl H.
Esbeck, Religion in the Public Square: Religion and the First Amendment: Some Causes of
the Recent Confusion, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883, 893 (2001) (arguing that such conflicts
between said religion clauses are extrinsic and avoidable); John Witte, Jr., American Legal
History: The Integration of Religious Liberty, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1369 (1992) (“The
drafters did not prefer one religion clause over the other or perceive any tension between [the
two].”); see generally William Cox, Jr., The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause
and Its Application to Education, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 111, 113 (2000/2001) (“[F]or the
greater part of this century, the Court has been without a principled basis for interpreting the
religion clauses of the First Amendment.”). Carl Esbeck argues that if the Court applies
neutrality, the tension between the two clauses disappears. See Esbeck, supra note 266, at 894.
265. Walz v. Tax Comm’r, 397 U.S. 644, 669 (1970).
266. Id.
267. See id. at 669–70 (“[T]here is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent
neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without
interference.”); see generally Shawn P. Bailey, The Establishment Clause and The Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 53, 53 (2003/2004)
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Although the focus was on an “adherence to the policy of neutrality,”
the theory of neutrality was only one of two distinct visions of religious
freedom.268 On the one hand, there was a vision grounded in secularism and
a strict separation of church and state (i.e. the secularist state).269 On the other
hand, the concept of neutrality rested on a pluralistic and egalitarian
perspective (i.e. the pluralist state).270 Under the secular model, the secularist
state is religiously neutral, and individuals are allowed to practice religion
freely in private with the expectation that they put aside their beliefs when
they act as public citizens.271 However, Michael McConnell contends that
what passes as religious neutrality is, in reality, an ideological preference in
different modes of thinking over others, that is, rationalism over
conscience.272 Further, since the secular state puts emphasis on maintaining
a wall of separation between church and state, it inadvertently puts less
emphasis on protecting the individual right of religious exercise.273 Thus, the
secular state places more emphasis on the anti-establishment rather than the
free exercise principle.
The secular argument against religious discourse in the public arena
rests on what is a perceived religious exclusivity of principles, such as
religious faith.274 Religious discourse is prohibited in the public arena
because individual rights can only be fully enjoyed when government bases
its fundamental rights on universally accessible principles.275 Nonetheless,
this argument points to several pieces of criticism.
First, religion in general and moral ideas from a generalized view of
religion can be accessed universally.276 Second, prohibiting religious
(affirming Establishment Clause requires neutrality toward religion); Gabriel A. Moens, The
Menace of Neutrality in Religion, 2004 BYU L. REV. 535, 536 (2004) (“The Supreme Court
has interpreted the Establishment Clause as requiring or involving the application of the
neutrality principle.”).
268. Viteritti, supra note 227, at 325; see also, Joseph P. Viteritti, Reading Zelman: The
Triumph of Pluralism, and Its Effects on Liberty, Equality, and Choice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV.
1105, 1123 (2003).
269. Viteritti, supra note 227, at 325.
270. Id.
271. Michael W. McConnell, Believers as Equal Citizens, in OBLIGATIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH 90, 100–01 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000).
272. Id. at 104.
273. Id.
274. DeForrest, supra note 236, at 610.
275. See Paul Weithman, Religious Reasons and the Duties of Membership, 36 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 511, 512 (2001) (examining the liberal concept of civic discourse).
276. DeForrest, supra note 236, at 611; see Thomas C. Berg, Religious Liberty in
America at the End of the Century, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 187, 188 (2001) (contending that
Supreme Court jurisprudence for the last two decades has been moving towards seeing religion
as meriting the same sort of constitutional protections as other ideas and activities.). Berg
writes:
[I]n the 1980s and 1990s, however, the Court began to move gradually from
church-state separation, with its distinctive treatment of religion, toward an
emphasis on the equality of religion with other ideas. The Court began
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discourse in the public arena goes against the grain of the liberal ideal of
“evaluating individual rights as existing prior . . . to ‘community and moral
commitments.’”277 Third, the secularist’s argument goes against the notion
of distributive justice.278 John Courtney Murray argues the moral principle of
distributive justice requires that “government, in distributing burdens and
benefits within the community, should have in view the needs, merits, and
capacities of the various groups of citizens and of society in general.”279
Finally, the secular prohibition on religious discourse is not in line
with the Constitution. The Constitution’s guarantee of religious freedom,
both under the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, promotes religious
diversity and thus allows pluralism to thrive because one community cannot
be privileged over the other.280 As a result, a secular prohibition of religious
discourse in the public arena favors one community (non-religionist) over
another community (religionist).281 Further, James Madison and Thomas
Jefferson understood the importance of equality of citizenship between nonbelievers and believers respectively.282 For both Madison and Jefferson,
equal citizenship in civil society meant sharing equally in the burdens and
benefits of a free society.283
In comparison, McConnell’s second model allows for public
participation in a way that least compromises an individual’s religious
beliefs.284 Pluralism, according to William Galston, is an essential component

permitting, and sometimes even requiring, the government to treat religion the
same as other ideas and activities: what Professor Douglas Laycock has called
‘formal neutrality’ between religion and nonreligion. Decisions by the early
1990s had firmly established rights of equal treatment for religious speech by
individuals in public schools, under the Free Speech Clause. The Court also
began, little by little, to approve programs of financial aid under which
religious institutions benefited on the same terms as others.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation
of the Establishment Clause, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 678 (2002) (arguing that the principle of
equal treatment of religion could conceivably justify vast increases in government funding of
religion).
277. DeForrest, supra note 236, at 612; see also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 245 (citing H. JEFFERSON
POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 6 n.16 (1993)).
278. DeForrest, supra note 236, at 612–14.
279. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON
THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 146 (1960).
280. DeForrest, supra note 236, at 614–16.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See Thomas Jefferson, An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (1786), reprinted
in THE ESSENTIAL THOMAS JEFFERSON 44–46 (John Gabriel Hunt ed., 1996); James
Madison, Memorial & Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), reprinted
in RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 63–68 (Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey &
Thomas C. Berg eds., 2002).
284. McConnell, supra note 271, at 104–05.
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of the modern liberal state.285 Resting on the classical liberal principles of
John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Adam Smith, pluralism allowed for
individuals to choose, without state intrusion, competing definitions of a
good life.286 Pluralism is only limited by the “core requirements of individual
security and civic unity.”287 As Galston explained, “[P]luralism is not the
same as value relativism; there is a distinction between good and bad, and
there are zones of legitimate intervention by the government through which
it can define the requirements of civic unity and order.”288
Justice Welch’s concept of neutrality fits into a pluralistic model and
foresees the possibility that government may have to intervene, and would
be permitted to do so, if it does not favor one over another.289 Similarly,
government, in a pluralistic system not constrained by a hard separation of
church and state like McConnell’s secularist state, can take action if religious
liberty is used improperly.290 As mentioned earlier, Justice Welch’s concept
of neutrality recognizes religion’s role in the formation of good
government.291 Pluralism also recognizes religion’s role in the formation of
good government in two ways. First, a pluralist society does not ask
individuals to put aside their religious beliefs as long as it does not touch
upon the “core requirements of individual security and civic unity.”292
Second, pluralism allows for competing definitions of what makes a good
society.293 In a pluralist society that allows such competing definitions of the
good, rather than ideological preferences as in the secularist society,
religion’s influence on what makes good government is a permissible part of
the debate.294
The Supreme Court has never wholly based its religion clauses
jurisprudence on secular or neutral grounds.295 For example, in Everson, the
Court envisioned a wall of separation between church and state, but still
approved a government-supported program providing transportation for
children attending either religious or public schools.296 Nonetheless, Thomas
285. Viteritti, supra note 268, at 1157.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1157–58.
289. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(describing the “marketplace of ideas”); Bd. of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 246, 248–51,
254 (1872).
290. See McConnell, supra note 271, at 100–01, 104; Viteritti, supra note 227, at 325;
Viteritti, supra note 268, at 1123. For example, the IRS’s denial of tax exemption status for
Bob Jones University to prohibit racial discrimination was permissible, denying that the IRS’s
non-discriminatory policy violated the university’s right of religious exercise. See Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602–05 (1983).
291. See sources cited supra notes 220–25.
292. See Viteritti, supra note 268, at 1157.
293. DeForrest, supra note 236, at 614–16.
294. See sources cited supra notes 220–25, 284–94.
295. Viteritti, supra note 227, at 325–26.
296. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
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Jefferson’s wall of separation does not stand on firm legal ground.297 This is
partly because of a fault in the secularist paradigm of the religious clauses.298
As Joseph Viteritti argues, the Jeffersonian vision of the religious
clauses “applies the Establishment Clause to compromise rights protected by
the Free Exercise Clause as if the two were in conflict.”299 However, the two
clauses are better understood as designed to protect an essential constitutional
right from two different directions.300 As formulated by Michael Paulsen:
The establishment clause protects religious liberty; it
safeguards much the same interests as the free exercise
clause, but in a slightly different way. The free exercise
clause defines the important individual liberty of religious
freedom while the establishment clause addresses the limits
of allowable state classifications affecting this liberty. The
two clauses, naturally enough, address a single, central value
from two different angles: The free exercise clause forbids
government proscription; the establishment clause forbids
government prescription. Stated narrowly, government can
neither keep persons from exercising certain religious
beliefs nor may it make them exercise any religion.301
Neutrality fits into Paulsen’s perspective of the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses. If government stands neutral on the issue of religion, it
does not run the risk of intruding on either an individual’s beliefs or practices.
Further, neutrality takes the Establishment Clause into account.
Under a stricter church and state separation, federal and state
governments run the risk of restricting rights under the Free Exercise Clause
while trying to protect rights under the Establishment Clause.302 Thus, the
promotion of a strict separation of church and state can come at the expense
of the principle of religious equality.303 For example, in Locke v. Davey, the
Supreme Court permitted the state of Washington to prohibit the use of state
funds to pursue a theology degree.304 The Locke Court rested its rationale
primarily on Establishment Clause grounds with little discussion on the
individual’s free exercise interest or neutrality.305

297. Viteritti, supra note 227, at 326.
298. Id. at 332.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 332–33.
301. Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection
Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 313 (1986).
302. Viteritti, supra note 227, at 326.
303. Paulsen, supra note 301, at 314.
304. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
305. Id. at 722–24.
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The Locke Court’s superficial approach to neutrality and free
exercise drove Justice Scalia’s dissent in Locke.306 Justice Scalia pointed out
that the majority overlooked the free exercise concerns of the individual,
which require “formal neutrality” as a requirement for “free exercise
constitutionality.”307 As a result, the majority’s opinion in Locke is a “pure
philosophical preference” to protect taxpayers’ “freedom of conscience not
to discriminate against candidates for the ministry.”308 Justice Scalia added
that, “This sort of protection of ‘freedom of conscience’ has no logical limit
and can justify the singling out of religion for exclusion from public
programs in virtually any context.”309 If such reasoning is “pure
philosophical preference,” as Justice Scalia suggests, then the Locke majority
falls into McConnell’s secularist state by giving one ideological preference
over another.310
More importantly, Justice Scalia observed that the Supreme Court
had rejected the approach taken by the majority in prior cases.311 In McDaniel
v. Paty, the Supreme Court took up a challenge to a Tennessee statute that
barred ministers from serving as delegates to the state’s 1977 constitutional
convention.312 Tennessee’s statute was based on the state’s 1796 constitution
prohibiting ministers from serving as legislators.313 Tennessee defended the
law as consistent with the Establishment Clause because they feared that
ministers in public office would “promote the interests of one sect or thwart
the interests of another, thus pitting one against the others, contrary to the
anti-establishment principle with its command of neutrality.”314 The
Establishment Clause interests notwithstanding, the Supreme Court found
that the Tennessee law violated the Free Exercise Clause.315 In short, the
McDaniel Court did not take Tennessee’s Establishment Clause argument for
face value, considering instead protections under the Free Exercise Clause.
Thus, neutrality did not just have an “anti-establishment principle,” it also
had a free exercise principle that needed to be reviewed by a court.316
In sum, Justice Welch’s vision of religion and state has found a place
in the Supreme Court.317 But how the Supreme Court defines neutrality is an
important indicator of how a case may be decided. If the Court looks at
306. Id. at 726–34 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 726.
308. Id. at 730.
309. Id.
310. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
311. Locke, 540 U.S. at 732–33.
312. 435 U.S. 618, 621 (1978).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 628–29.
315. Id. at 629.
316. Locke, 540 U.S. at 733. For further discussion on how the courts could consider both
the concerns of the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses, see generally Michael A.
Paulsen, supra note 301. A full analysis of this discussion is outside the bounds of the article.
317. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 733; McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 621; Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
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neutrality under the secularist point of view, government neutrality is tilted
towards Thomas Jefferson’s strict “wall of separation.”318 Neutrality tilted to
a wall of separation, or a strict wall of separation, may permit government
action under the Establishment Clause without reviewing, or giving weight
to, free exercise concerns.319 In his Locke dissent, Justice Scalia was
concerned by the lack of such review and by the majority’s approach of
taking Washington’s anti-establishment rationale at face value.320
Such a methodology is concerning. For example, if Tennessee’s
establishment clause argument were taken for face value, then the result of
McDaniel changes.321 As a result, the minister’s free exercise rights would
be limited.322 Justice Welch’s concept of neutrality, along with the pluralist
vision of neutrality, alleviates this concern.323 Neutrality under the pluralist
state is not tilted in one direction or the other.324 As a result, neutrality is
broader since it must take into account both Establishment and Free Exercise
Clause concerns.325 It is this version of neutrality that the Supreme Court
described in Walz and McDaniel and that Justice Scalia described in his
Locke dissent.326
B. Trinity Lutheran v. Comer: Neutrality and the Wall Illustrated
In 2017, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to review its decision
in Locke.327 The dispute in Trinity Lutheran arose from recycled tires, of all
things.328 The Missouri Department of Natural Resources Scrap Tire Program
offered grants to reimburse the cost to qualifying nonprofit organizations that
purchased playground surfaces made from recycled tires.329 The Missouri
Scrap Tire Program grants were awarded on a competitive basis to nonprofit
organizations scoring the highest in several categories.330
In 2012, the Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning Center (the
Center), a pre-school operating on church property, sought to replace its
playground’s gravel surface with a rubber surface through the Missouri Scrap
Tire Program.331 Unfortunately, the Missouri Department of Natural
Resources had a policy of denying grants to any applicant owned or

318. See sources cited supra notes 269–75.
319. McConnell, supra note 271, at 104.
320. Locke, 540 U.S. at 733–34.
321. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 732–33; McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 621, 628–29.
322. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 732–33; McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 621, 628–29.
323. See sources cited supra notes 269–75, 289–94 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 285–94 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 285–94 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 266–68, 304–20 and accompanying text.
327. See Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
328. Id. at 2017.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
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controlled by a religious entity, such as a church.332 The Department’s policy
stemmed from their interpretation of article I, section 7 of the Missouri
constitution, which obliged “[t]hat no money shall ever be taken from the
public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, priest,
preacher, minister or teacher . . . .”333 Although the Center scored fifth among
forty-four applicants, the Department determined that article I, section 7 of
the Missouri constitution made the Center ineligible to receive a grant.334
The District Court found in favor of Missouri and dismissed the
Center’s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that the
denial of the grant was discriminatory.335 According to the District Court, the
denial of benefits was similar to the denial of benefits in Locke, and the Free
Exercise Clause did not require Missouri to provide the money to the
Center.336 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in affirming the
District Court’s decision, held that while Missouri could award a grant, the
Free Exercise Clause did not mandate that Missouri ignore the
“antiestablishment principle reflected in its own Constitution.”337 Judge
Gruender, dissenting, opined that the states did not have limitless power to
exclude religious organizations from generally available benefits.338
In a 7–2 decision, the Supreme Court agreed with Judge Gruender
and overturned the Eighth Circuit.339 Chief Justice Roberts began the
majority opinion by stating that both sides agreed that the Establishment
Clause does not prevent Missouri from giving a grant to the Center.340 As
such, the question before the Court was whether the Free Exercise Clause
was violated by Missouri’s categorical denial of a grant of money.341 Chief
Justice Roberts laid out the “basic principle” that “denying a generally
available benefit solely on account of religious identity imposes a penalty on
the free exercise of religion that can be justified only by a state interest ‘of
the highest order.’”342 Further, the Free Exercise Clause is not violated when
a government’s law or regulation is “neutral and generally applicable”
without concern for religious identity.343
Chief Justice Roberts summed up this point of view of Free Exercise
Clause jurisprudence:

332. Id.
333. Id.; see also MO. CONST. art. I, § 7.
334. Trinity Lutheran, 132 S. Ct. at 2018.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 2019.
339. Id. at 2025.
340. Id. at 2019.
341. Id. at 2019–25.
342. Id. at 2019 (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978)).
343. Id. at 2020–21.
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[T]he Court recounted the fundamentals of our free exercise
jurisprudence. A law, we said, may not discriminate against
“some or all religious beliefs.” Nor may a law regulate or
outlaw conduct because it is religiously motivated. And,
citing McDaniel and Smith, we restated the now-familiar
refrain: The Free Exercise Clause protects against laws that
“impose[] special disabilities on the basis of . . . religious
status.”344
Put plainly, Missouri’s categorical denial of the Center’s grant award was a
form of express discrimination.345
As the preacher in McDaniel, the Center was left with a choice to
either participate in a generally available benefit program or to continue as a
religious institution.346 Although the Missouri Scrap Tire Program permitted
the Center to continue as a church, the cost of their freedom of free exercise
was an absolute bar from a public program for which they qualified.347 A
program that forces a religious organization to disavow its religious character
“inevitably deter[s] or discourage[s] the exercise of First Amendment
rights.”348
Chief Justice Roberts then turned his attention to the Locke decision.
Missouri and the Eighth Circuit argued that the Department’s denial of
benefits was similar to that in Locke.349 However, the Center’s case was
distinguishable from the student’s in Locke. In Locke, the student was not
denied because of his or her religious identity but because of what he or she
proposed to do.350 Unlike the Center, the student did not have to make a
choice to forgo his or her religious identity to be a part of Washington’s
scholarship program.351 Although Chief Justice Roberts did not discuss
Missouri’s constitution or the Blaine Amendment by name, he also did not
discount Missouri’s anti-establishment interest.352 A state’s antiestablishment interest did not come into play unless it was determined that a
government program required the individual or organization to choose
between exercising religion or receiving a public benefit for which they were

344. Id. at 2021.
345. Id. at 2021–22.
346. Id. at 2022–23.
347. Id. at 2022.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 2023–24.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 2023.
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qualified.353 Because Missouri’s program required the Center to make such a
choice, it violated the Free Exercise Clause.354
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor opined that the majority’s holding
turned the church-state relationship upside down by weakening “this
country’s longstanding commitment to a separation of church and state
beneficial to both.”355 Further, the majority’s holding, according to Justice
Sotomayor, found that the Constitution required the government to deliver
public funds directly to a church.356 Perhaps because Justice Sotomayor
sensed a change in the church-state relationship, Justice Sotomayor wrote
two dissents: one to the majority’s holding and a second to the majority’s
brushing aside of the Establishment Clause.357
In short, Missouri would violate the Establishment Clause if it
provided the grant to the Center because the playground was used in
conjunction with Trinity Lutheran’s religious mission.358 The Supreme
Court’s precedent reflected that the “government may not directly fund
religious exercise[,]” especially when public funds would “advance
religion.”359 Missouri’s grant would have advanced religion by allowing the
353. Id. at 2023–24 (“Relying on Locke, the Department [of Natural Resources]
nonetheless emphasizes Missouri’s similar constitutional tradition of not furnishing taxpayer
money directly to churches. But Locke took account of Washington’s antiestablishment
interest only after determining, as noted, that the scholarship program did not ‘require students
to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.’”) (citations
omitted).
354. Id. at 2024–25. Chief Justice Roberts stated:
Nearly 200 years ago, a legislator urged the Maryland Assembly to adopt a bill
that would end the State’s disqualification of Jews from public office:
“If, on account of my religious faith, I am subjected to disqualifications,
from which others are free, . . . I cannot but consider myself a persecuted
man. . . . An odious exclusion from any of the benefits common to the rest
of my fellow-citizens, is a persecution, differing only in degree, but of a
nature equally unjustifiable with that, whose instruments are chains and
torture.” Speech by H. M. Brackenridge, Dec. Sess. 1818, in H.
Brackenridge, W. Worthington, & J. Tyson, Speeches in the House of
Delegates of Maryland, 64 (1829).
The Missouri Department of Natural Resources has not subjected anyone to
chains or torture on account of religion. And the result of the State’s policy is
nothing so dramatic as the denial of political office. The consequence is, in all
likelihood, a few extra scraped knees. But the exclusion of Trinity Lutheran
from a public benefit for which it is otherwise qualified, solely because it is a
church, is odious to our Constitution all the same, and cannot stand.
Id.
355. Trinity Lutheran, 132 S. Ct. at 2027.
356. Id.
357. See generally id. at 2027–41.
358. Id. at 2028–31.
359. Id. at 2028–30.
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Trinity Church to improve the Center to promote “the spiritual growth of the
children of its members and to spread the Church’s faith to the children of
nonmembers.”360 Additionally, government programs providing public funds
favor those religious institutions that are organized and funded enough to
successfully win such a grant.361 As such, the government is favoring one
religion over the other, violating the spirit of what the Establishment Clause
was meant to prevent.362 In essence, the Establishment Clause was not meant
to provide equal opportunity of public funds to religious institutions, but to
maintain clear lines of separation between church and state.363
The second portion of Justice Sotomayor’s dissent focused on
whether the Free Exercise Clause permits a line to be drawn based on one’s
religious status because of anti-establishment principles.364 For Justice
Sotomayor, Missouri’s anti-establishment interest, as Washington’s interest
in Locke, permitted such a line to be drawn.365 Interestingly, Justice
Sotomayor pointed to “benevolent neutrality” as justification for singling out
religious organizations based on status alone.366 She stated, “This space
between the two [Religion] Clauses gives government some room to
recognize the unique status of religious entities and to single them out on that
basis for exclusion from otherwise generally applicable laws.”367 In this case,
when the state invokes the longstanding anti-establishment principle of no
aid to religion, “the government may sometimes close off certain government
aid programs to religious entities.”368 Based on this longstanding principle,
Missouri’s constitutional prohibition was “reasonable and [sound]
constitutional judgment.”369
Where does the Trinity Lutheran decision stand in our discussion of
neutrality? At neutrality’s most basic level, Missouri Scrap Tire Program’s
prohibition of religious organizations based on religious status alone is
unconstitutional. In Justice Welch’s concept of neutrality, if the government
provides a benefit to everyone, it cannot subsequently decide to deny a
benefit because of religious identity.370 However, Justice Welch may find it
problematic that the program could indirectly favor religious organizations
that are better able to seek out government benefits compared to those
religious organizations that are less able.371
360. Id. at 2029.
361. Id. at 2031.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. See id. at 2031–41.
365. See id.
366. See id. at 2031.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 2032.
369. Id.
370. See sources cited supra note 216–25 and accompanying text.
371. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2030–31 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Today’s
opinion suggests the Court has made the leap the Mitchell plurality could not. For if it agrees
that the funding here will finance religious activities, then only a rule that considers that fact
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Chief Justice Roberts paints the concept of neutrality into the
pluralist worldview. As mentioned earlier, the pluralist view of neutrality
allows a participant in society to keep his or her beliefs open while
participating in society.372 Chief Justice Roberts looks to McDaniel and
narrowly reads Locke in order to to lay the groundwork for the idea that to
receive a public benefit, government cannot deny such benefits solely on
religious identity.373 But as in Minor, the majority in Trinity Lutheran
recognized a boundary between state and religion. Although Trinity Lutheran
narrowed Locke’s reach, the majority recognized anti-establishment
principles could still be a reason to uphold a law.374
However, a state’s use of the anti-establishment principles cannot be
taken into account until it is determined that an individual does not have to
set aside his or her religious status at the door before participating in
society.375 What is unclear is how this view will translate into the broader
scheme of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and the “play in the
joints” between them. Yet the narrowing of Locke suggests that just as the
Establishment Clause may limit the Free Exercise Clause, the Free Exercise
Clause can also limit the Establishment Clause in certain situations.376 This
suggestion pushes a court to take into equal consideration the interests under
both religion clauses.377 Thus, Chief Justice Roberts’s decision in Trinity
Lutheran necessarily points to a version of neutrality in a pluralist state,
rather than a hard wall of separation, and the secularist state.378
Justice Sotomayor’s version of neutrality is much like the secular
state model of neutrality.379 When Justice Sotomayor discusses “benevolent
neutrality,” she states that such neutrality will permit religious exercise only
“without sponsorship and without interference.”380 By linking religious
exercise to the sponsorship of religion, Justice Sotomayor ties the freedom to
exercise with the principle of separation.381 Such a tie between the freedom
of exercise and a wall of separation favors the anti-establishment principle
more than the free exercise principle.
irrelevant could support a conclusion of constitutionality. The problems of the “secular and
neutral” approach have been aired before. It has no basis in the history to which the Court has
repeatedly turned to inform its understanding of the Establishment Clause. It permits direct
subsidies for religious indoctrination, with all the attendant concerns that led to
the Establishment Clause. And it favors certain religious groups, those with a belief system
that allows them to compete for public dollars and those well-organized and well-funded
enough to do so successfully.”).
372. See sources cited supra notes 284–94 and accompanying text.
373. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2022–24.
374. See generally id. at 2022–23.
375. Id. at 2023–24.
376. See generally id. at 2022–24.
377. Id.
378. See sources cited supra notes 286–90 and accompanying text.
379. See sources cited supra notes 269–77 and accompanying text.
380. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2031.
381. Id.
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For example, Justice Sotomayor pointedly accepted that religious
status could be singled out in a public benefit program open to the general
public because of the anti-establishment/funding principle.382 Second, Justice
Sotomayor, unlike Chief Justice Roberts, does not factor in whether allowing
a prohibition based on religious identity forces the individual or organization
to let go of religious identity in order to participate in the public sphere as the
preacher in McDaniel.383 In essence, Chief Justice Roberts determined that a
court must first ask whether an individual or organization must leave its
religious identity in order to participate in the public sphere before looking
at the anti-establishment principle. Justice Sotomayor, on the other hand,
pushes courts to ask whether the anti-establishment principle is justified
before examining whether an individual has to make a choice between
participating in the public arena or keeping his or her religious identity.
CONCLUSION
Justice Welch’s opinion stands for more than its “doctrine of hands
off.”384 The doctrine of hands off is neither a call for an impregnable wall of
separation nor a denial of religion’s role in government. The Minor decision
marked a move of American legal thought from Christianity as a part of
American law to the hopes of moral republicanism and the principle of
separation of church and state.385 What came out of Minor was the genesis of
the concept of neutrality.386
Rather than an impregnable “wall of separation,” neutrality provided
a gated wall between the domains of religion and state.387 In recognizing
religion’s role in the formation of good government, neutrality provided a
way for government to accommodate religion in certain cases.388
The days of arguing that Christianity is part of American law and
that government is required to support religion simply because it is important
to the fate of society are no longer prominent in today’s courtrooms.389
Nonetheless, those arguments brought forward an idea that the religion
clauses were more than the anti-establishment principle. The antiestablishment principle must also consider the principle of free exercise (and
vice versa).390 As such, neutrality, without a hard wall of separation, drives
towards an equal accommodation of these principles and a fuller
understanding of the religion clauses. Thus, Justice Welch’s concept of
neutrality was more than reading the Bible in schools—it marked a shift in
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. See sources cited supra notes 119–23, 217–24 and accompanying text.
385. Bd. of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 254 (1872).
386. See sources cited supra notes 217–24 and accompanying text.
387. See sources cited supra notes 211–16 and accompanying text.
388. See sources cited supra notes 217–24 and accompanying text.
389. See sources cited supra notes 134–46, 159–69 and accompanying text.
390. Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2017).
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American legal thought.391 That shift in thought lives on today in Trinity
Lutheran v. Comer.392 Recently, the debate over the meaning of neutrality
continued at the Supreme Court in American Legion v. American Humanist
Ass’n.393 Nonetheless, the law stands where Justice Welch stood, walking a
fine line between moral republicanism and Jeffersonian secularism or, in
modern parlance, separation and accommodation—with neutrality as its
guide.

391. Although the outgrowth from Trinity Lutheran is still new, its concept of neutrality
has started to gain traction. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found. v. Morris Cty. Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders, 181 A.3d 992 (N.J. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 909 (2019); Moses v.
Ruszkowski, No. S-1-SC-34974, 2018 WL 6566646 (N.M. Dec. 13, 2018); Taylor v. Town
of Cabot, 178 A.3d 313, 321 (Vt. 2017). Particularly, in Morris Cty. Bd., Justice Kavanaugh,
joined by Justices Gorsuch and Alito, cited Trinity Lutheran as affirming the proposition for
religious equality in American jurisprudence. Morris Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v.
Freedom from Religion Found., 139 S. Ct. 909 (2019). Justice Kavanaugh added, “The
principle of religious equality eloquently articulated by Justice Brennan in McDaniel [and a
large part of Chief Justice Roberts’s rationale in Trinity Lutheran] is now firmly rooted in this
Court’s jurisprudence.” Id. at 909. As such, the concept of neutrality beginning in Minor, and
built on in Trinity Lutheran, may have a wider impact on our understanding of the Religion
Clauses and American jurisprudence.
392. 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
393. Compare Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2090–91 (2019)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (“The Court must instead consider each case in light of the basic
purposes that the Religion Clauses were meant to serve: assuring religious liberty and
tolerance for all, avoiding religiously based social conflict, and maintaining that separation of
church and state that allows each to flourish in its ‘separate spher[e].’” (quoting Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring))), and id. at 2094 (Kagan, J.,
concurring) (“But I find much to admire in this section of the opinion—particularly, its
emphasis on whether longstanding monuments, symbols, and practices reflect ‘respect and
tolerance for differing views, an honest endeavor to achieve inclusivity and nondiscrimination,
and a recognition of the important role that religion plays in the lives of many Americans.’
Here, as elsewhere, the opinion shows sensitivity to and respect for this Nation’s pluralism,
and the values of neutrality and inclusion that the First Amendment demands.” (quoting id. at
2089)), with id. at 2103–13 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“If the aim of the Establishment
Clause is genuinely to uncouple government from church, the Clause does ‘not permit . . . a
display of th[e] character’ of Bladensburg’s Peace Cross.” (quoting Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 817 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting))).

